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NOTES

CALIFORNIA CERTIORARI: A MISUSED WRIT
Section 1068 of the California Code of Civil Procedure clearly limits certiorari
to cases where "an inferior tribunal, board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded the jurisdictionof such tribunal, board, or officer." 1 Another
Code of Civil Procedure section re-enforces the jurisdiction function of certiorari
by providing that "The review upon this writ cannot be extended further than to
determine whether the inferior tribunal, board, or officer has regularly pursued
the authority of such tribunal, board, or officer." 2 This note will demonstrate
how the scope of certiorari has been extended beyond the narrow jurisdictional
limits set by these statutes when the writ is used to review the decisions of a
3
local board or agency.
Exclusion of Certiorariat State Board Level
The California Supreme Court held in Standard Oil Co. v. State Bd. of
Equalization4 that certiorari could not be employed to review the decisions of
state-wide boards or agencies. In that case the certiorari petitioner contended
that the board was acting in a judicial capacity, a requisite to the issuance
of certiorari, when it imposed a retail sales tax. In response the court held
that a state administrative agency could not be invested with judicial powers
because the California constitution limits judicial power to specific courts
except for some local purposes. Since the board had state-wide jurisdiction
the writ of certiorari was denied. 5
Implied in the Standard Oil Co. decision was the court's sanction for use
of certiorari to review decisions of local boards, and the writ has continued
to be employed for that purpose. 6 However, in 1950 the constitutional authority
of the legislature to create inferior courts was repealed.7 But in Savage v. Sox, 8
a 1953 case, the district court of appeals concluded that local boards have
CODE CIV. PRoc. § 1068 (emphasis added).
2It was decided early that the word "authority" in § 1074 is the equivalent of the
word "jurisdiction" in § 1068: Quinchard v. Board of Trustees of Alameda, 113 Cal. 664,
668, 45 Pac. 856, 857 (1896); Farmers and Merchants' Bank v. State Bd. of Equalization,
97 Cal. 318, 326, 32 Pac. 312, 314 (1893); Central Pac. R.R. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 43 Cal. 365, 367 (1872).
'Examples of local boards and agencies are boards of supervisors, civil service boards,
and retirement boards.
' 6 Cal. 2d 557, 59 P.2d 119 (1936).
'An important exception developed to this rule that certiorari will not issue to review
the decisions of state administrative agencies because they lack judicial power. In the
case of Covert v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. 2d 125, 173 P.2d 545 (1946), it was
held that the California constitution specifically granted the board judicial power in
the alcoholic beverage licensing area. Therefore, certiorari was the proper remedy. Boren
v. State Personnel Bd., 37 Cal. 2d 634, 234 P.2d 981 (1951), reiterated this exception.
"E.g. Livingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272
P.2d 4 (1954) ; Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 129 P.2d 349 (1942) ; Greif
v. Dullea, 66 Cal. App. 2d 986, 153 P.2d 581 (1944); Ware v. Retirement Bd., 65 Cal.
App. 2d 781, 151 P.2d 549 (1944).
'Cal. Stat. 1949, ch. 153 § 2, pp. 3291-93.
8118 Cal. App. 2d 479, 258 P.2d 80 (1953).
'CAL.
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quasi-judicial powers by virtue of another article of the constitution. 9 The net
result is that a court, in determining whether a writ of certiorari should issue,
will consider a local board the equivalent of an inferior court because it is
invested with quasi-judicial power. And yet, as will be demonstrated, the requirements for obtaining the writ to review the decisions of lower courts are
not the same as those when the decisions of local boards are under review.
Review of Inferior Court Decisions by Certiorari
California cases, where certiorari is requested as a means of reviewing an
inferior court decision, adhere strictly to the jurisdiction language of section
1068 by denying the writ when the petitioner for certiorari fails to show that
the lower court was acting in excess of its jurisdiction.'" In Howard v. Superior
Court" the California Supreme Court, which denied certiorari, held that the
writ could not be used as a writ of error" nor could the showing by the petitioner that the lower court committed an "abuse of discretion" be substituted
for the "excess of jurisdiction" requirement."3 But it is clear that "abuse of
discretion" has been a ground for the issuance of certiorari where the decision
of a local board is under review despite the jurisdictional confinement of
certiorari by section 1068.14
Review of Local Board Decisions
The confusion surrounding the use of certiorari to review decisions of local
boards and agencies seems to have had its inception in Garvin v. Chambers.15
In that case an Oakland policeman's dismissal on grounds of insubordination
was upheld by the Oakland Civil Service Board. The officer applied for a writ
of certiorari to the superior court and was successful in obtaining an annulment of the board's ruling. The board then took an appeal to the California
Supreme Court, contending the writ should not have issued because the function
of certiorari is limited to the question whether the board had jurisdiction to
conduct a hearing concerning the discharged policeman. It further argued
that even if there had been a complete absence of evidence to support a finding

9
This constitutional section contains home rule charter provisions. For a thorough
discussion of the effect of the Standard Oil Co. case and Savage v. Sox, see Kleps, Certiorarified Mandamus Reviewed: The Courts and California Administrative Decisions-1949-1959,
12 STAN. L. REv. 554, 561 (1960).
"0 Simmons v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 373, 341 P.2d 13 (1959) ; Howard v. Superior
Court, 25 Cal. 2d 784, 154 P.2d 849 (1944) ; Estrin v. Superior Court, 14 Cal. 2d 670, 96
P2d 340 (1939); Estate of Ryker, 95 Cal. App. 2d 507, 213 P.2d 420 (1950); Carmm
v. Justice Court, 35 Cal. App. 293, 170 Pac. 409 (1917). See also Estate of Kay, 30 Cal.
2d 215, 226, 181 P.2d 1, 7 (1947), where the court said "It need hardly be added that
on certiorari we do not review matters within the discretion of the lower court." Spanach
v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 2d 447, 50 P.2d 444 (1935), is an identical holding.
S25 Cal. 2d 784, 154 P.2d 849 (1944).
"Id. at 787, 154 P.2d at 850.
"'Id. at 788, 154 P.2d at 851.
'See note 6 supra.
'195 Cal. 212, 232 Pac. 696 (1924).
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that the officer had been guilty of insubordination, this would only amount to
an erroneous decision occurring within the board's jurisdiction. In response
to the board's contention, the petitioner asserted that there had indeed been
a complete absence of evidence to support the board's findings of insubordination, and that this was sufficient for the granting of certiorari to permit review
of a decision rendered by an inferior quasi-judicial board or tribunal.
The court reiterated the rule that certiorari goes only to the jurisdiction
of an inferior board and does not lie to review the evidence presented before
it.16 The court, however, went on to state an exception to the preceding rule:
[W]hen the board or tribunal in question has power to act only upon the establishment of a certain set of facts which necessarily form the foundation of jurisdiction
and, therefore, may be denominated jurisdictional facts and there is no evidence
whatever to show the existence of such facts, a finding by such board or tribunal
that those facts do exist cannot foreclose inquiry by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon certiorari,as to whether or not the order sought to be reviewed is without
any evidence to support it or is absolutely contrary to the uncontradicted and uncon7
fiicting evidence upon which it purports to rest.'
In sustaining the issuance of certiorari by the superior court the supreme court
stated that the necessary "jurisdictional facts" were not established at the civil
service hearing when the officer answered to charges of insubordination, and
therefore the evidence given at the board hearing could be reviewed on certiorari.
However, at the onset of its opinion the supreme court admitted that (1) there
had been a sufficient complaint made against the officer to the Civil Service
Board; (2) that the city charter of Oakland entitled the accused to appear
personally before the board at a public hearing; and (3) that the officer gave
evidence on his own behalf and the opposing side offered evidence to support
the contention that the officer had committed insubordination. In view of these
concessions it is difficult to understand how the majority of the supreme court
reached the conclusion that the board failed to establish the necessary "jurisdictional facts." One dissenting opinion aptly pointed out that the "determination
of the question of guilt or innocence of the petitioner was arrived at by the
board in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and however erroneous it may be it is
not void for want of power to render the decision." Another dissenting justice
stated that:
Upon the admitted facts of this case the civil service board had jurisdiction, both
of the subject matter and of the parties. It was expressly vested in this proceeding
with the jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal and to annul or affirm the
"In Halpern v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. 384, 386, 212 Pac. 916, 917 (1923) the court
said, "The province of certiorari is to review the record of an inferior court, board, or
tribunal, and to determine from the record whether such court, board, or tribunal has
exceeded its jurisdiction. The reviewing court is bound by the record, which must be
taken as true." Cases in accord are: Schubert v. Bates, 30 Cal. 2d 785, 793, 185 P.2d 793,
797 (1947) ; Borchard v. Board of Supervisors, 144 Cal. 10, 14, 77 Pac. 708, 709 (1904) ;
Los Angeles v. Young, 118 Cal. 295, 298, 50 Pac. 534, 535 (1897) ; White v. Superior Court,
110 Cal. 60, 64, 42 Pac. 480, 481 (1895); Hoffmann v. Superior Court, 79 Cal. 475, 476,
21 Pac. 862 (1889). Also, Mr. Witkin states that certiorari. is not a means of reviewing
the evidence submitted by the parties. 1 WITKIN, CALFORNUA PROCEDURE Jurisdiction
§ 116 (1954).
"195 Cal. 212, 221, 232 Pac. 696, 700 (1924) (emphasis added)

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

order appealed from. If it did either of these upon insufficient evidence, its action
s
in so doing was but error in the exercise of jurisdiction.'
While the conclusion is inescapable that Garvin was erroneously decided,
the supreme court at least purported to confine the scope of certiorari to
review of the jurisdiction issue. Had the decision been confined in subsequent
cases to the "jurisdictional fact" 19 statement made by the court in Garvin
no substantial digression from the restrictions imposed by sections 1068 and
20
1074 need have resulted. However, in Walker v. City of San Gabriel, Garvin
was cited for the proposition that "Either certiorari or mandamus is an appropriate remedy to test the proper exercise of discretionvested in a local board." 21
In Walker the court held that the revocation of a license without competent
evidence constitutes an "abuse of discretion" and found that the respondent
city council had revoked the petitioner's license to conduct an automobile
wrecking business solely upon hearsay evidence. Although mandamus was
the writ which actually issued, the court concluded that the Los Angeles Superior Court should have granted either mandamus or certiorari because the
city council had committed an "abuse of discretion."
2
Subsequent casesP have cited the dictum in Walker as authority for the

"Id. at 241, 232 Pac. at 708. Mr. Witkin has pointed out that the cases in California
hold that where a court has power "to hear and determine the cause the court may rule
erroneously on matters of pleading, evidence or other procedure; may determine the issues
of substantive law incorrectly; and may give judgment for a party not entitled thereto, or
may grant relief not warranted by the pleadings, evidence or the law. Any or all of these
errors of procedure or substantive law may normally be reviewed by the established methods
(chiefly motion for new trial, motion to vacate judgment, and appeal). But they are errors
within jurisdiction, and not grounds for collateral attack on the judgment, nor for direct
attack by the jurisdictional writs of certiorari or prohibition." 1 WrrKIN, CALIFORMA PaoCEDURE Jurisdiction § 116 (1954).
"' Stumpf v. Board of Supervisors, 131 Cal. 364, 63 Pac. 663 (1901), offers a true
example of a "jurisdictional fact." In that case the board failed to establish whether or not
the signatures on a petition for an election were actually signatures of true residents and
freeholders. Since a valid petition was necessary to give the board jurisdiction in order to
consider the offered petition the failure by the board to establish whether the petition was
valid meant that it had not established a necessary "jurisdictional fact," and therefore
certiorari was issued.
-20 Cal. 2d 879, 129 P.2d 349 (1942).
nId.
at 881, 129 P.2d at 350 (emphasis added). As support for its statement that either
certiorari or mandamus could be used "to test the proper exercise of discretion vested in a
local board" the supreme court also cited the following cases: Garvin v. Chambers, 195 Cal.
212, 232 Pac. 696 (1924) ; Mann v. Tracy, 185 Cal. 272, 196 Pac. 484 (1921) ; Dierssen v.
Civil Service Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 2d 53, 110 P.2d 513 (1941), and Naughton v. Retirement
Bd. of San Francisco, 43 Cal. App. 2d 254, 110 P.2d 714 (1941). These cases neither held
nor implied that certiorari could be used by a reviewing court as a means of determining
whether or not a local board had abused its discretion, nor could a reading of these cases as
a unit give them the meaning claimed by the supreme court. For example, in Naughton v.
Retirement Bd. of San Francisco, supra, the petitioner obtained a writ of mandamus from the
superior court and the board, on appeal, elaimed that only certiorari should have issued. The
-court denied the board's contention on this point and specifically said that mandamus was
the writ to issue when a local board had abused its discretion.
mLivingston Rock & Gravel Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 43 Cal. 2d 121, 272 P.2d 4

